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Non-technical summary 
Recent decades have seen a shift in academic research towards the ‘entrepreneurial university’ 
model. Researchers are encouraged to actively participate in innovation through channels such as 
academic patenting, joint work with industry, or academic entrepreneurship. Besides obvious 
benefits of technology transfer and increased funding at research institutions through industry 
collaborations, scholars have expressed concerns that the shift towards entrepreneurial universities 
may entail negative implications for the rate and direction of academic research. Examples include 
trade-offs between publishing and patenting, academic entrepreneurship and the ‘brain drain’ in 
academia, the dissemination of research results, and the withholding of information, data and 
materials on which research is based. 
In this paper, we focus on how extramural and in particular industry funding of academic 
research affect academics’ sharing behavior. Our research builds on a broad individual-level 
dataset of German academics. In the regressions we disentangle total extramural funding received 
from funding that comes specifically from industry sponsors and find that, controlling for personal 
characteristics, research characteristics, institutional affiliations, and scientific fields, scientists 
who receive external funding from any source are more likely to be denied access to others’ 
research results or materials. Those who receive industry funding are more likely to deny others’ 
requests for access. These results reflect the changes in incentives of researchers to disclose as 
funding moves towards the private sector. Our results have implications for both science 
institutions and funding bodies. 
  
 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
In den vergangenen Jahren haben sich viele öffentliche Forschungseinrichtungen in zunehmendem 
Grad kommerziell ausgerichtet. Forscher werden ermutigt, aktiv in Innovationsprojekten 
mitzuarbeiten, ihre Arbeit zu patentieren, gemeinsam mit der Industrie zu forschen oder ein 
Unternehmen zu gründen. Die mit einem solchen Technologietransfer von der öffentlichen 
Forschung in die Praxis einhergehenden Vorteile bringen jedoch auch Probleme mit sich. So führt 
die Finanzierung eines Forschungsprojektes durch die Industrie oftmals dazu, dass 
Forschungsvorhaben an den Interessen der Industrie ausgerichtet werden. Dies beinhaltet eine 
Abkehr von Grundlagen- hin zur angewandten Forschung sowie ein Zurückhalten von 
Forschungserbnissen, damit diese patentiert und Innovationsrenditen angeeignet werden können. 
Darüber hinaus könnten Forscher weniger bereitwillig ihre Daten und anderen 
Forschungsmaterialien mit anderen Forschern teilen, um die Validität und Replizierbarkeit der 
Ergebnisse zu überprüfen. 
In diesem Artikel untersuchen wir die Beziehung zwischen externer Finanzierung von 
Forschungsprojekten und hier insbesondere Industriefinanzierung und der Entscheidung von 
Forschern, Forschungsinputs zurückzuhalten oder selbst einmal keinen Zugang zu 
Forschungsinputs erhalten zu haben. Wir nutzen Daten aus einer umfangreichen Befragung 
deutscher Wissenschaftler und finden, dass – kontrolliert für individuelle Charakteristika, 
Forschungscharakteristika, institutionelle Zugehörigkeit und Disziplin – Industriefinanzierung 
tatsächlich mit der Verweigerung des Zugangs zu Forschungsinputs korreliert. Demgegenüber hat 
Industriefinanzierung keine Beziehung dazu, ob ein Wissenschaftler selbst schon einmal keinen 
Zugang erhalten hat. Unsere Ergebnisse haben Implikationen für Wissenschaftseinrichtungen und 
Forschungsfinanzierungsorganisationen. 
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Abstract 
The viability of modern open science norms and practices depend on public disclosure of new 
knowledge, methods, and materials. However, increasing industry funding of research can 
restrict the dissemination of results and materials. We show, through a survey sample of 837 
German scientists in life sciences, natural sciences, engineering, and social sciences, that 
scientists who receive industry funding are twice as likely to deny requests for research inputs 
as those who do not. Receiving external funding in general does not affect denying others 
access. Scientists who receive external funding of any kind are, however, 50% more likely to 
be denied access to research materials by others, but this is not affected by being funded 
specifically by industry. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent decades have seen a shift in academic research towards the ‘entrepreneurial 
university’ model. Researchers are encouraged to actively participate in innovation through 
channels such as academic patenting, joint work with industry, or academic entrepreneurship 
(Etzkowitz, 2003). Besides obvious benefits of technology transfer and increased funding at 
research institutions through industry collaborations, scholars have expressed concerns that 
the shift towards entrepreneurial universities may entail negative implications for the rate and 
direction of academic research. Examples include trade-offs between publishing and 
patenting (Azoulay et al., 2009), academic entrepreneurship and the ‘brain drain’ in academia 
(Toole and Czarnitzki, 2010; Aghion et al., 2008), the dissemination of research results 
(Czarnitzki et al., 2011; Blumenthal et al., 1996a,b; Cohen et al., 1998; Gans and Murray, 
2011; Thursby and Thursby, 2007), and the withholding of information, data and materials on 
which research is based (Walsh et al., 2007; Haeussler, 2011; Haeussler et al., 2014). 
This paper seeks to contribute to the latter stream of research. Sharing data and 
material inputs to research is one of the cornerstones of scientific progress since it allows 
replication, validation and the cumulative advance of knowledge in a field. Data and research 
materials are also a major source of scientific misconduct. One prominent case is the South 
Korean scientist Woo-Suk Hwang and his colleagues who published an article in Science in 
2005 claiming to have isolated embryonic stem cells from a cloned human embryo (Hwang et 
al., 2005). Scientists immediately started research to build on these highly exciting findings. 
However, the published results turned out to be fabricated, and the paper was retracted less 
than a year later (Azoulay et al., 2012). Another case is the prolific Danish neuroscientist 
Milena Penkowa who had published almost 100 papers in renowned journals. In January 
2011 Nature reported that Penkowa had left her position at the University of Copenhagen 
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under allegations of scientific misconduct (including the fabrication of data and misspending 
of grant money). While Penkowa had been cleared of allegations of scientific fraud in 2008 
(colleagues had trouble replicating her results), new allegations arose in 2010: two of 
Penkowa’s students did not manage to replicate data submitted to the Journal of Clinical 
Oncology by Penkowa (see Callaway, 2011). More generally, Azoulay et al. (2012) find that 
out of the 1104 retractions identified in ‘Pubmed’, the US National Library of Medicine, 739 
(67%) were due to issues related to data fabrication, data errors or mistakes, failure to 
replicate results, or plagiarism. This suggests that more open sharing of data and material 
could serve as a major source of quality control in scientific research.  
In this paper, we focus on how extramural and in particular industry funding of 
academic research affect academics’ sharing behavior. Although extramural and particularly 
industry funding of research are responsible for a growing share of academic research 
(OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators, 2010), relatively little attention has been 
devoted to studying the relationship between funding and sharing behavior. Industry funding 
has frequently been characterized as posing restrictions on researchers, prohibiting or 
delaying the open disclosure of research results (Blumenthal et al. 1996a,b; Cohen et al. 
1998; Gans and Murray 2011; Thursby and Thursby 2007). This could hamper scientific 
research, as the public disclosure of research results limits a duplication of research, and 
facilitates replication and follow-up research (Dasgupta and David 1994).  
Our research builds on a broad individual-level dataset of German academics. 
Germany experienced the largest growth in industry sponsorship of academic research (13.4 
percentage points between 1995 and 2007) among developed countries, making it especially 
suitable for this investigation. Moreover, our data allow us to provide evidence for a broad set 
of scientific disciplines while prior research is largely confined to the bio sciences which are 
characterized by all kinds of peculiarities in research conduct and funding compared to other 
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disciplines (e.g., Haeussler, 2011; Haeussler et al., 2014). In the regressions we disentangle 
total extramural funding received from funding that comes specifically from industry 
sponsors and find that, controlling for personal characteristics, research characteristics, 
institutional affiliations, and scientific fields, scientists who receive external funding from 
any source are more likely to be denied access to others’ research results or materials. Those 
who receive industry funding are more likely to deny others’ requests for access. These 
results reflect the changes in incentives of researchers to disclose as funding moves towards 
the private sector. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes current 
literature on academics’ sharing behavior and the relation between industry sponsorship of 
academic research and disclosure. Section 3 describes the data and methods. Results and 
concluding remarks are shown in sections 4 and 5. 
2. Literature background 
2.1 Input sharing among academics 
A few recent studies have looked more in detail into academics’ sharing behavior. Walsh et 
al. (2007) surveyed 507 academic researchers in biomedical sciences to assess what affects 
access to knowledge and material inputs. Of the scientists surveyed in the two years before 
the survey 75% requested material and made seven requests on average. Only 81% of the 
most recent requests were fulfilled. Those receiving the requests reported that they did not 
fulfill the request in 6% of the cases. Their results indicate that requests to scientists active in 
business, scientists in fields with higher degrees of competition, and scientists with higher 
publication outputs were more likely to remain unfulfilled. However, the authors found no 
significant effect of the requesting scientist’s industry funding. 
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Haussler (2011) reports the likelihood with which scientists in industry and academe 
share information, using a survey of bioscientists in Germany and the United Kingdom. 
Academic scientists reported providing 85% of the requested information, while industry 
researchers reported to have provided 58%. The share of information exchanged further 
depends negatively on its competitive value, the expected level of reciprocity (positively, but 
only among industrial researchers), social factors (norms regarding information sharing and 
entrepreneurs in the scientists’ family), the type of enquirer, and the degree to which the 
requested information is protected by non-disclosure agreements. 
Haeussler et al. (2014) hypothesize that information sharing among academics is 
highly context-specific, arguing that specific requests for information or materials are 
weighted in terms of future reciprocity versus current loss of competitiveness, while general 
sharing of intermediate results is affected by the need for feedback versus potential 
misappropriation. They then employ a survey of 1173 bioscientists in Germany and the 
United Kingdom to support these claims, showing that specific as well as general sharing are 
negatively affected by competition in the field and the importance researchers attach to 
patents for their reputation. Moreover, tenured professors are more likely to engage in 
specific information sharing. General sharing occurs less often in larger teams and by people 
who have applied for more patents, but more often for researchers who publish more.  
2.2 External sponsorship and disclosure 
Several papers have found harmful effects of industry sponsorship on the disclosure of 
research findings. For instance, Gans and Murray (2011) report, based on data on contract 
terms offered to industrial sponsors, that the majority of contracts allowed for the restriction 
and disclosure of information designated as confidential. Blumenthal et al. (1996b) surveyed 
210 life science companies to find evidence of publication delays and secrecy restrictions on 
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information resulting from academic research. Thursby and Thursby (2007) surveyed 112 
firms engaged in university licensing to find that 90% of the university contracts include 
clauses on withholding of research results. 
Blumenthal et al. published six studies in which they report the results of three life 
science faculty surveys between 1985 and 2000 (Blumenthal et al. 1986, 1996a, 1997, 2006; 
Campbell et al. 2000, 2002). These studies find that researchers with industry sponsored 
projects are more likely to report industry ownership of results, pre-publication review, 
publication delays, and secrecy. Czarnitzki et al. (2011) employ a survey of German 
researchers to investigate the relation between industry sponsorship and the disclosure of 
academic research, in the forms of publication delays and secrecy, finding that scientists with 
higher degrees of industry sponsorship (i.e. a larger share of their total budget comes from 
industry sources) have higher probabilities of facing publication delays, or (partial or full) 
publication bans. The amount of total extramural funding also has a positive effect on 
withholding research results. 
Hong and Walsh (2009) combined two surveys of researchers in experimental 
biology, mathematics, and physics on how safe they perceived discussing current work with 
colleagues. In 1966, 49% of the surveyed 1,042 scientists indicate not feeling safe talking 
with others about their research. By 1998, this increased to 72% (out of 192 scientists 
surveyed). This increase is strongest in experimental biology where the share of scientists 
concerned with secrecy has skyrocketed from 55% to 87%. The authors then show that 
having industry funding relates to higher levels of increased secrecy, as does having stronger 
scientific competition. 
The above overview suggests extramural and particularly industry funding to be 
related to the likelihood that scientists will share their data and material inputs and to the 
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likelihood that scientists themselves will deny others access to their inputs. In the following, 
we seek to provide empirical evidence based on a comprehensive sample of German 
academics in order to elucidate the relationship between funding and sharing behavior. 
3. Data and Methods 
We use data from an online survey of German academic researchers performed by the Centre 
for European Economic Research (ZEW) in the context of an evaluation of the EU’s 6th 
European Framework programme. The survey was conducted in 2008. The sample includes 
German Ph.D. level researchers who were employed at universities or not-for-profit research 
institutions. To identify university professors, a register (“Hochschullehrerverzeichnis”) was 
employed that excludes teaching-oriented universities in applied sciences. Not-for-profit 
institutes include the Fraunhofer Society, the Max Planck Society, the Helmholtz 
Association, and the Leibniz Association. Scientists employed there were identified using 
internet searches.
1
 This yielded a sample frame of 16,269 scientists with known email 
addresses. 2,797 researchers completed at least one question in the survey. Removing 
observations with missing values of interest for the purpose of this study, we end up with a 
final sample of 837 observations.
2
 
We test the representativeness of our sample by comparing it to the population distribution of 
public research scientists across institutional categories (universities versus PROs) and 
disciplines obtained from the Federal Statistical Office. The official and sample shares are 
presented in Table 1. While the sample is reasonably representative of the population, there 
are some small differences. Our sample has 8% more scientists employed in public research 
                                                          
1
 These institutes are major actors in German science, and have many branches across disciplines. For example, 
the Fraunhofer society has 17,000 employees in 59 institutes. The other science organizations are of comparable 
size. It is common for German university professors to head research groups at these institutes. 
2
 The large discrepancy here is caused in part by many researchers filling in only few questions. Only 1,400 
scientists considered all questions in the survey. As these still had some item non-response, we had to exclude 
part of the sample. 
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organizations than the population. The sample also contains 5% more life scientists, 2.4% 
fewer science/humanities researchers, and 1.8% fewer natural scientists than the population. 
To ensure the robustness of our results, we re-estimated the regression models presented in 
section 4 adjusting for any bias caused by field or institute sampling through population 
weights based on eight institute-field strata (see table A.1 in appendix). The results are highly 
similar to those of the un-weighted sample.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
The dependent variables are derived from two survey questions regarding the disclosure of 
research materials to colleagues. The first one asks “Have you requested any research results 
(such as software, genetic sequences, data), and/or research materials since 2002 from other 
scientists but did not get access?”. Table 2 shows summary statistics. Respondents could 
check boxes “yes”, “no”, or “not specified”. 139 respondents, or 17% of the sample, 
indicated that they had requested results or materials but did not receive them. The second 
question asked “Have you denied other scientists access to your research results or materials 
since 2002?”. This was the case for 57 respondents (7%). Of those who were denied or who 
denied access (169 observations), 112 (66%) were denied access but did not deny it 
themselves, 30 (18%) only denied access to others, and 27 (16%) did both. 
The main explanatory variables are two dummy variables whether the researcher 
received funding from third-party sources and whether, among the third-party resources, the 
researcher received funding specifically from industry. Both dummies correspond to the time 
period 2002-2006. 84% of the researchers reported third-party funding, and 33% reported that 
8 
 
they received industry funding. Scientists who received third-party funding were significantly 
more likely to be denied access to others’ research results or materials (18% of those with 
funding vs. 10% of those who did not (t-test on mean differences = -2.35, p-value = 0.02), but 
not more likely to deny access to others (7% vs. 7%, t-test = -0.05, p-value=0.96). Scientists 
who received industry funding were not more likely to be denied access by others (18% vs. 
16%, t-test = -0.79, p-value = 0.43), but were more likely do deny others (12% vs. 4%, t-test 
= -3.86, p-value < 0.01). 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
We control in the analysis for research characteristics, personal characteristics, scientific 
domains, and institutional affiliations. Research characteristics include the individual’s 
position at the institution, the number of publications and patent applications, and the number 
of scientists employed at the respondent’s institute who work on similar topics. The latter 
serves as a proxy for the degree of scientific competition of the field, as greater scientific 
competition associates with higher levels of secrecy (Hong and Walsh, 2009; Haeussler, 
2011). Personal characteristics are age, gender, and whether the scientist is tenured. In terms 
of domains, the researchers were grouped in four broad fields consisting of life sciences, 
natural sciences, engineering, and social sciences. Institutional affiliations include 
universities, the four large public research associations (Fraunhofer, Max-Planck, Helmholtz 
and Leibniz), and a residual group of other affiliations (these include public research 
institutes which are financed by the states and not the federal government, for instance).
3
 
                                                          
3 All these variables have been collected in the survey. In order to check the reliability of the information 
provided in the survey, we also gathered the publication and patent data from external databases (the ISI Web of 
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To examine the relation between third-party and industry funding and the disclosure 
of research results and materials, we specify Probit models. Since the descriptive statistics 
suggest being denied access and denying access to be related, we also specify a Bivariate 
Probit model to account for any error term correlation between the equations of being denied 
access and denying access to others.  
4. Results 
Table 3 presents the regression results. We first estimate a Probit model for ‘Being denied 
access by others’ (column 1). Other factors equal, scientists who received third party funding 
are more likely to have been denied access to others’ research results and materials. The 
magnitude of the marginal effect is also sizeable: other factors at the mean, the probability of 
being denied access increases from 14% to 21% if the dummy indicating third party funding 
switches from zero to unit value. Receiving funding specifically from industry and the other 
research characteristics do not have significant effects. In line with previous studies (e.g. 
Hong and Walsh 2009), we observe that scientists in the life sciences are more likely to be 
denied access.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
Concerning the equation on ‘Denying access’ (column 2), we find no significant effect of 
third-party funding. This indicates that extramural funding in general, including funding from 
German or European government organizations, does not hamper the direct dissemination of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Science and the PATSTAT patent database). Although the numbers did not match exactly, the results do not 
depend on the source of the data (survey vs. publication/patent databases). This test of data reliability makes us 
confident that also the other variables are quite accurately reported by the scientists. Note that the results 
reported below are obtained by using the externally collected patent and publication data. 
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results and materials to others. However, the coefficient of receiving industry funding is 
positive and significant. The size of the marginal effect is large: other factors at the mean, 
receiving industry funding increases the probability of denying access from 5% to 10%. The 
switch from no industry contracts to having industry funding thus doubles the likelihood of 
keeping research materials secret.  
Column 3 jointly estimates both equations in a Bivariate Probit model taking the 
correlation between the error terms into account. The error term correlation is positive (ρ = 
0.5) and significant (LR test on correlation being zero: χ²(1) = 27.18, p-value < 0.01). We 
thus conclude that a random shock resulting in being denied access to material also translates 
into the reaction of denying access to others and vice versa. The results concerning the 
coefficient estimates model are very similar to the univariate Probit models. 
We interpret our findings as follows: the result that researchers who have industry 
funding are more likely to deny access to research materials might, in line with the literature, 
reflect clauses in the contracts with industry sponsors that the research has to be kept secret 
(at least for a certain amount of time) so that the industry sponsor can appropriate possible 
commercial returns afterwards. In addition, the scientist might realize that she or he possesses 
a monopoly in a certain domain and that this could not only be profitable for the institution 
regarding research budgets but also privately profitable, be it either supplemental 
remuneration by the public research institution for attracting outside funding or other private 
consulting contracts. Since the result in the ‘Deny access’ equation is only found for the 
industry dummy and not for the extramural funding in general, it is plausible to assume that 
contract clauses imposed by the industry partners are the main reason for not sharing 
materials. As this strongly contradicts the paradigm of open science the trend towards 
entrepreneurial universities should not be celebrated for improved technology transfer 
without caution as, in the extreme, it threatens the trust, credibility (because of impossible 
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replication of results) and the evolution of science, and thus also technological progress in the 
long-run. 
When we consider the results for the likelihood to be denied access to research 
materials it turns out that industry funding is not of particular importance. Instead we find 
that scientists with extramural research funding in general are more likely to be denied 
access. We attribute this finding to the fact that these scientists might conduct research in 
domains that are more competitive than the topics that are being investigated by people that 
did not rely on extramural research funding. While funding processes are usually merit-based 
and highly credentialed scientists are more likely to secure such funding (Grimpe, 2012), our 
result do not suggest, however, that being denied access or denying access is connected to the 
scientists’ individual research productivity in terms of publications and patents. In that sense, 
we do not find the two outcomes to be particularly salient for “star” versus “non-star” 
scientists. 
Before we conclude, note that we also re-estimate the models using linear probability 
models (LPMs) rather than Probit models. While the LPM assumes constant marginal effects 
over the distribution of the regressors and could produce predictions that are not bound 
between zero and one, it, unlike the Probit model, does not require the normality assumption 
which, if violated, could lead to inconsistent coefficient estimates in the Probit model. All the 
findings reported above were very similarly found using the LPMs and therefore we do not 
report these in more detail here. 
Also note that we tested for heterogeneity of the identified effects across scientific 
fields. Neither of these tests showed significant differences. This is noteworthy as most 
existing research focuses on the life sciences. We find that the relationship between 
extramural/industry funding and the access to research materials does not significantly differ 
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between life sciences, natural sciences, engineering and social sciences. Admittedly, our field 
definitions are quite broad because of our limited sample size. More research could be 
devoted to the heterogeneity across fields in order to further investigate this issue.  
5. Conclusion 
Using a comprehensive and cross-discipline dataset on German academics, we provide 
evidence that industry sponsorship relates to increased denial of requests for research results 
and materials while extramural funding in general is related to scientists experiencing denial 
of access themselves. Hence, our research contributes to the literature in several ways. First, 
we connect research on academics’ sharing behavior with the literature that studies the 
implications of extramural and particularly industry funding on the disclosure of academic 
research. In that sense, we complement other research on the relation between industry 
funding and disclosure, which argues that industry sponsorship can harm the public 
disclosure of academic research (Czarnitzki et al., 2011; Blumenthal et al. 1986, 1996a, b, 
1997, 2006; Campbell et al. 2000, 2002, Hong and Walsh, 2007; Walsh et al. 2007).  
Second, prior research has largely focused on university scientists the bio sciences. 
Our study broadens the results obtained in prior research by considering a more general 
sample of scientific disciplines and institutions. We show that limited sharing as a result of 
extramural funding is not only a phenomenon apparent only in the bio sciences but instead a 
broad problem. This is further illustrated in the regression tables provided in appendix table 
A.2, where we estimate the probability to deny access to others in and outside of the life 
sciences. The effect is present in both, even though the marginal effect of industry funding is 
much higher in the life sciences (industry funding more than quadruples the probability of 
denying funding to others from 2% to 9% in the life sciences, compared with a doubling from 
5% to 10% outside of the life sciences). 
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An implication of our findings is that scientific institutions may need to consider 
policies that govern the sharing behavior of scientists in order to assure the opportunity to 
replicate, validate and cumulatively advance the knowledge in the field. Our results also 
stress that these policies need to be encompassing in the sense that they do not only pertain to 
research in the life sciences. Another implication concerns the funding bodies, particularly 
governments and science foundations, which could more actively promote open science and 
urge scientists to share their research inputs with others. 
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Tables 
Table 1 German academic scientist population and sample field distribution 
 Population Share 
Academic Scientists 
Sample Share 
Academic Scientists 
Employed in university (vs. PRO) 67.6% 59.6% 
   
Field   
Natural sciences 31.1% 29.3% 
Engineering sciences 19.3% 19.6% 
Life sciences 25.2% 29.2% 
Social sciences and humanities 24.4% 22.0% 
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
Variable 
full sample 
Was not denied 
access 
Was denied access Did not deny access Denied access 
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. 
Total observations (%) 837 (100%) 698 (83%) 139 (17%) 780 (93%) 57 (7%) 
Research characteristics           
Was denied access  0.166 0.372 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.144 0.351 0.474 0.504 
Denied access to others 0.068 0.252 0.043 0.203 0.194 0.397 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
Received third party funding 0.840 0.367 0.827 0.379 0.906 0.292 0.840 0.367 0.842 0.368 
Received industry funding 0.331 0.471 0.325 0.469 0.360 0.482 0.314 0.464 0.561 0.501 
Research group leader 0.730 0.444 0.722 0.448 0.770 0.422 0.726 0.446 0.789 0.411 
Journal publications 35.014 58.483 34.665 58.573 36.770 58.208 35.882 59.741 23.140 35.484 
Patent applications 0.802 2.818 0.811 2.869 0.755 2.559 0.754 2.713 1.456 3.969 
Number of peers in institute 24.201 48.809 23.244 45.853 29.007 61.519 24.017 49.451 26.719 39.241 
Personal characteristics           
Researcher has tenure 0.836 0.370 0.850 0.358 0.770 0.422 0.840 0.367 0.789 0.411 
Female dummy 0.146 0.353 0.146 0.353 0.144 0.352 0.145 0.352 0.158 0.368 
Age  49.542 8.377 50.200 8.373 46.239 7.608 49.635 8.394 48.264 8.106 
Science domains           
Life sciences 0.292 0.455 0.259 0.439 0.453 0.500 0.295 0.456 0.246 0.434 
Natural sciences 0.293 0.455 0.315 0.465 0.180 0.385 0.303 0.460 0.158 0.368 
Engineering 0.196 0.397 0.193 0.395 0.209 0.408 0.176 0.381 0.474 0.504 
Social sciences 0.220 0.414 0.232 0.422 0.158 0.366 0.227 0.419 0.123 0.331 
Institutions           
Employed at university 0.596 0.491 0.605 0.489 0.554 0.499 0.606 0.489 0.456 0.503 
Employed at Fraunhofer Society 0.049 0.216 0.050 0.218 0.043 0.204 0.042 0.201 0.140 0.350 
Employed at Max Planck Society 0.091 0.287 0.092 0.289 0.086 0.282 0.092 0.290 0.070 0.258 
Employed at Helmholtz Association 0.154 0.361 0.148 0.355 0.187 0.391 0.147 0.355 0.246 0.434 
Employed at Leibniz Association 0.063 0.244 0.054 0.227 0.108 0.311 0.064 0.245 0.053 0.225 
Employed at other research institute 0.091 0.287 0.092 0.289 0.086 0.282 0.090 0.286 0.105 0.310 
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Table 3: Multivariate regression results 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
Was denied 
access 
Denied 
access to 
others 
Was 
denied 
access 
Denied 
access to 
others 
Received third party funding 0.389** -0.335 0.375** -0.297 
 
(0.182) (0.225) (0.181) (0.221) 
Received industry funding 0.056 0.481*** 0.043 0.417** 
 
(0.131) (0.177) (0.131) (0.175) 
Female dummy -0.137 0.195 -0.123 0.222 
 
(0.162) (0.204) (0.159) (0.198) 
Age  -0.086 0.102 -0.079 0.115 
 
(0.074) (0.096) (0.075) (0.097) 
Age squared 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Researcher has tenure -0.041 -0.391* -0.044 -0.342 
 
(0.177) (0.228) (0.176) (0.227) 
Research group leader 0.185 0.355* 0.174 0.344* 
 
(0.141) (0.193) (0.141) (0.191) 
Journal publications 0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.003 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Patent applications -0.004 0.012 -0.006 0.010 
 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) 
Number of peers in institute 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Domain: life sciences 0.470*** 0.161 0.482*** 0.194 
 
(0.167) (0.241) (0.167) (0.241) 
Domain: natural sciences -0.262 -0.114 -0.235 -0.103 
 
(0.184) (0.260) (0.184) (0.259) 
Domain: engineering 0.223 0.661*** 0.217 0.671*** 
 
(0.191) (0.238) (0.191) (0.239) 
Employed at Fraunhofer Society -0.194 0.478* -0.147 0.501* 
 
(0.292) (0.278) (0.287) (0.275) 
Employed at Max Planck Society 0.018 0.329 -0.009 0.317 
 
(0.213) (0.297) (0.215) (0.294) 
Employed at Helmholtz Association 0.323* 0.601*** 0.314* 0.614*** 
 
(0.174) (0.218) (0.172) (0.216) 
Employed at Leibniz Association 0.680*** 0.397 0.662*** 0.333 
 
(0.213) (0.320) (0.214) (0.324) 
Employed at other research institute 0.012 0.209 -0.020 0.130 
 
(0.198) (0.255) (0.202) (0.264) 
Intercept 1.370 -4.183* 1.218 -4.559* 
 
(1.770) (2.333) (1.784) (2.349) 
Corr (     ) 
  
0.501*** 
# Observations 837 837 837 
Log-Likelihood -338.11 -181.63 -506.16 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *(,**,***): p < 0.1(p  < 0.05, p < 0.01).  
Columns (1), (2): Probit models; (3): Bivariate Probit models.  
Reference categories for the dummy variables: male, non group leader, untenured, social 
scientist, employed at a university. 
 
19 
 
Appendix  
Table A.1 weighted regression results using eight institution-discipline strata 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
Was denied 
access 
Denied access to 
others 
Was denied 
access 
Was denied 
access 
Received third party funding 0.378** -0.352* 0.365** -0.309 
 
(0.184) (0.211) (0.184) (0.214) 
Received industry funding 0.049 0.458** 0.036 0.397** 
 
(0.133) (0.180) (0.132) (0.180) 
Female dummy -0.135 0.227 -0.117 0.246 
 
(0.167) (0.212) (0.164) (0.210) 
Age  -0.077 0.119 -0.070 0.133 
 
(0.075) (0.091) (0.076) (0.089) 
Age squared 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Researcher has tenure -0.013 -0.485** -0.017 -0.440* 
 
(0.176) (0.230) (0.175) (0.228) 
Research group leader 0.146 0.381** 0.134 0.371** 
 
(0.139) (0.170) (0.140) (0.173) 
Journal publications 0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.003 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Patent applications -0.002 0.016 -0.005 0.015 
 
(0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) 
Number of peers in institute -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Domain: life sciences 0.471*** 0.042 0.483*** 0.082 
 
(0.167) (0.248) (0.167) (0.244) 
Domain: natural sciences -0.286 -0.110 -0.258 -0.095 
 
(0.187) (0.260) (0.185) (0.257) 
Domain: engineering 0.208 0.654*** 0.203 0.664*** 
 
(0.195) (0.253) (0.194) (0.250) 
Employed at Fraunhofer Society -0.239 0.482 -0.190 0.504* 
 
(0.273) (0.297) (0.268) (0.292) 
Employed at Max Planck Society -0.026 0.160 -0.058 0.129 
 
(0.230) (0.303) (0.234) (0.293) 
Employed at Helmholtz Association 0.406** 0.601*** 0.396** 0.625*** 
 
(0.180) (0.222) (0.178) (0.223) 
Employed at Leibniz Association 0.642*** 0.278 0.623*** 0.219 
 
(0.222) (0.333) (0.223) (0.317) 
Employed at other research institute 0.077 0.237 0.048 0.160 
 
(0.207) (0.247) (0.214) (0.244) 
Intercept 1.212 -4.600** 1.047 -4.994** 
 
(1.813) (2.276) (1.836) (2.228) 
Corr (     ) 
  
0.585*** 
# Observations 837 837 837 
Log-Likelihood -328.261 -169.045 -135922.9 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *(,**,***): p < 0.1(p  < 0.05, p < 0.01).  
Columns (1), (2): Probit models; (3): Bivariate Probit models.  
Reference categories for the dummy variables: male, non group leader, untenured, social scientist, employed at a 
university. 
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Table A.2: Denying access to others: life sciences versus other fields 
 
(1) (2) 
 
In life sciences Outside life sciences 
Received third party funding -0.844 -0.367 
 
(0.514) (0.279) 
Received industry funding 0.988** 0.504** 
 
(0.453) (0.210) 
Female dummy 0.669* 0.034 
 
(0.385) (0.273) 
Age  0.019 0.157 
 
(0.272) (0.111) 
Age squared -0.001 -0.002 
 
(0.003) (0.001) 
Researcher has tenure -0.048 -0.483* 
 
(0.476) (0.280) 
Research group leader 0.682 0.320 
 
(0.502) (0.224) 
Journal publications -0.005 -0.001 
 
(0.004) (0.002) 
Patent applications -0.178 0.017 
 
(0.204) (0.023) 
Number of peers in institute 0.003 -0.003 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Domain: natural sciences  -0.137 
  (0.274) 
Domain: engineering  0.569** 
  (0.246) 
Employed at Fraunhofer Society 0.398 0.508 
 
(0.829) (0.309) 
Employed at Max Planck Society 1.087** -0.133 
 
(0.520) (0.484) 
Employed at Helmholtz Association 0.700 0.662** 
 
(0.464) (0.265) 
Employed at Leibniz Association 1.431** -0.021 
 
(0.581) (0.479) 
Employed at other research institute 0.140 0.316 
 
(0.598) (0.299) 
Intercept -1.610 -5.504** 
 
(6.231) (2.723) 
# Observations 244 593 
Log-Likelihood -42.075 -131.009 
Notes: Dependent variable: denied access to others. Standard errors in parentheses. *(,**,***): p < 0.1 (p < 
0.05,  
p < 0.01). Probit models. Reference categories for the dummy variables: male, non group leader, untenured, 
employed at a university. Column 2: reference field: social scientist.. 
 
